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Interest Of Amici1
Amici curiae are Representatives W .J. “Billy” Tauzin and John D. Dingell,
the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, the authorizing committee with jurisdiction over the Federal Trade
Commission. Amici authored, and were integral in securing passage of, legislation
supporting the Commission’s “Do Not Call” rules at issue in this appeal. 2
Amici have dual interests in this litigation. First, amici have an institutional
interest in ensuring that the judiciary upholds federal consumer protection laws and
regulations that are consistent with Congressional enactments and the First
Amendment. Second, amici have a substantive interest in ensuring that the Court
understands the underlying basis of the Commission’s decision to regulate
commercial calls and non-commercial calls differently.
1

.................................. All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
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The following members of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, each of
whom is either Chairman or Ranking Member of a subcommittee, also support this brief:
Representative Fred Upton, Chairman, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the
Internet; Representative Edward J. Markey, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and the Internet; Representative Cliff Stearns, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection; Representative Janice D.
Schakowsky, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer
Protection; Representative Rick Boucher, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy
and Air Quality; Representative Michael Bilirakis, Chairman, Subcommittee on Health;
Representative Sherrod Brown, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Health;
Representative Jim Greenwood, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations; Representative Peter Deutsch, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations; Representative Paul E. Gillmor, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Environment and Hazardous Materials; and Representative Hilda L. Solis, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous M aterials.
1

Introduction
In 1995, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) promulgated telemarketing
rules that prohibit “a seller or telemarketer [of goods or services] from calling a
consumer who has previously asked not to be called by or on behalf of that seller.”
68 Fed. Reg. 4580, 4629 (Jan. 29, 2003). See also 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(A).
Earlier this year, the FTC amended its rules to make it easier for consumers to
avoid telemarketing calls. Under the revised rule, commonly known as the “Do
Not Call” rule, individuals can choose to prohibit all commercial telemarketing
calls to their homes or cellular phones, with a limited exception for calls made
pursuant to an established business relationship. See 16 C.F.R. §
310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B); 68 Fed. Reg. at 4629, 4632. The revised FTC rules also, for
the first time, impose limitations on telemarketing for charitable donations; under
the new rules, individuals may prohibit calls to their homes by any charities that
they specifically designate. See 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(A); 68 Fed. Reg. at
4629.
Put together, the two provisions now authorize individuals to prohibit both
commercial and charitable telephone solicitations in their homes. The “Do Not
Call” registry allows them to prohibit all commercial telemarketing; if they would
like to make company-specific exceptions to that general ban, they may do so by
giving commercial entities express permission to call them. See 16 C.F.R. §
310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(i); 68 Fed. Reg. at 4629.3 There is no mechanism for
prohibiting all charitable solicitations, but citizens may designate any specific
charity from which they do not wish to receive home solicitation calls. The
difference between the regulation of commercial telemarketing and charitable
solicitation is in the default rules: citizens must take affirmative steps to receive
commercial telemarketing calls (once they have signed up with the “Do Not Call”
registry) and to avoid charitable solicitations.
As set forth below, the FTC’s decision to regulate commercial telemarketing
and non-commercial telemarketing differently was based on legislative and
regulatory findings that: (1) commercial solicitations are far more intrusive than
non-commercial solicitations; and (2) commercial telemarketers are more likely to
engage in abusive practices than telemarketers soliciting for charities. Those
findings are more than adequate to support a system that allows citizens to prohibit
commercial telemarketing on a blanket basis and charitable solicitation on a
charity-specific basis. Accordingly, the Do Not Call rule does not impermissibly
discriminate against commercial speech and is entirely consistent with the First
Amendment.
3

By the same token, if an individual makes a company-specific request not to be
called and would otherwise fall within the established business relationship exception, a
seller may not call the individual “regardless of whether the consumer does business with
the seller.” 68 Fed. Reg. at 4634. See also 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(ii).
2

Argument
Under well-established Supreme Court precedent, the federal government
has the power to regulate truthful commercial speech as long as: (1) its interest is
substantial; (2) the regulation it proposes “directly advances” that interest; and (3)
the regulation is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
In order to satisfy the second and third prongs of this test, the government need
only demonstrate a “reasonable fit” between the identified problem and the
government’s solution – not a “perfect fit.” United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509
U.S. 418, 429, 434 (1993) (“Nor do we require that the Government make progress
on every front before it can make progress on any front.”); Bd. of Trustees v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (requiring “a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but
reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one
whose scope is ’in proportion to the interest served’; that employs not necessarily
the least restrictive means but, . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective”); Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 656 n.4,
658-59 (8th Cir. 2003). And “reasonable fit” need not be shown by volumes of
scientific research or studies. The standard is far more generous than that:
“anecdotes . . . history, consensus, and ‘simple common sense’” all will suffice to
show both the extent of the problem and that the regulation in question will
alleviate it. Florida Bar v. Went For It., Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995); Nixon,
323 F.3d at 654.
Finally, in reviewing regulations such as the Do Not Call rule, courts afford
substantial deference to any legislative conclusions that informed the regulatory
decision at issue, because Congress is “’far better equipped than the judiciary to
“amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data” bearing upon legislative
questions.’” Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997). See also City
of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002) (plurality); Fox, 492 U.S.
at 478; Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1995). In fact, the Supreme
Court has recognized that courts should afford “an additional measure of
deference” to Congressional findings in applying the second and third prongs of
the Central Hudson test, “lest [courts] infringe on traditional legislative authority
to make predictive judgments when enacting nationwide regulatory policy.”
Turner, 520 U.S. at 196.
Over the last twelve years, Congress has held numerous hearings and
enacted several pieces of legislation addressing telemarketing abuses. Through
that process, Congress amassed a substantial legislative record on which the FTC
relied in promulgating the regulations at issue here. As set forth below, that record
amply demonstrates that commercial telemarketing differs from charitable
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solicitation in at least two respects relevant here. First, citizens, as a general rule,
consider commercial telemarketing far more intrusive than charitable solicitations.
Second, commercial telemarketing is more prone to abuse than is charitable
solicitation. Given those differences, the “fit” between the Do Not Call rule and
the chief concerns raised by telemarketing is more than sufficient, and the rule falls
comfortably within the boundaries of the First Amendment. See Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761, 774-77 (1993) (invalidating ban on personal solicitation by
accountants, despite similar ban for lawyers, because lawyers are more likely to
engage in overreaching and other forms of misconduct than accountants, and “the
constitutionality of a ban on personal solicitation will depend on the identity of the
parties and the precise circumstances of the solicitation”).4
I.
The Legislative Record Underlying The Federal Trade Commission’s
Do Not Call Rule Demonstrates That Commercial Telemarketing Is Far
More Intrusive Than Non-Commercial Telemarketing.
When Congress began investigating the state of telemarketing in the early
1990s, it found that commercial telemarketing was by far the most intrusive type of
telemarketing. After holding a series of hearings that ultimately led to passage of
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”), Congress concluded
that “most unwanted telephone solicitations are commercial in nature” and “that
unwanted commercial calls are a far bigger problem than unsolicited calls from
political or charitable organizations.” H.R. Rep. No. 102-317, at 16 (1991)
(Submitted by former Chairman Dingell) (emphasis added).5
The Supreme Court’s holding in Cincinnati v. Discovery Networks, Inc., 507 U.S.
410 (1993), relied upon by plaintiffs, is not to the contrary. In that case, there was no
evidence – nor could there be – that people found commercial newsracks to be more
aesthetically unpleasant than newsracks containing newspapers and other non-commercial
periodicals. See id. at 425-26. Here, the record makes clear that solicitations by
commercial telemarketers are not only more invasive than non-commercial calls, but also
more likely to be coercive or fraudulent and to swindle vulnerable individuals (such as
senior citizens). Moreover, unlike the regulation at issue in Discovery Networks, the rules
at issue here regulate both commercial and non-commercial speech. They simply
regulate them differently because they raise different levels of concern.
4

5

While the TCPA was not the statute that authorized the FTC to explore the
possibility of a “Do Not Call” registry, see infra at 9, it was the first statute in a series that
reflected the evolution of Congress’ thinking on the matter and its measured responses to
4

This conclusion was not mere speculation – it was backed by Congressional
testimony as well as hard data. Among those who testified about the problem,
there was a clear consensus that people consider commercial calls to be far more
annoying and invasive than charitable calls. For example, in 1991, Robert
Bulmash of Private Citizen, Inc., a consumer group dedicated to protecting privacy
rights, testified that “[t]he rating of consumer non-acceptance on telemarketing, is,
first and foremost, automatic dialing sales; then live sales; then charity; then
legitimate survey research, and then finally, on the lowest level of annoyance is
political calls.” Hearing on S. 1462, S. 1410 & S. 857 Before the Subcomm. on
Communications of the Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transport., 102d Cong.,
at 26 (1991). Similarly, Michael Jacobson, Co-founder of the Center for the Study
of Commercialism, another public interest group, testified that “[t]he very idea of
having the sanctity of one’s home invaded by these commercial intruders is
offensive.” Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
The Bulmash and Jacobson testimony confirmed what Members of Congress
have been hearing from constituents for years – that calls from commercial
telemarketers are more invasive than non-charitable solicitations. As

the problems of commercial telemarketing. As a result, the FTC “considered, among
other things, the approach taken by Congress and the FCC in the TCPA and its
implementing regulations” when enacting its “Do Not Call” rules. 68 Fed. Reg. at 4591.
Accordingly, as this Court already has recognized, the history of the TCPA also bears on
the review of the FTC’s “Do Not Call” rules. See Order, at 14 (10th Cir. Oct. 7, 2003).
5

Representative Markey stated during the debate that led to the TCPA, “[m]any
consumers complain bitterly that when [the telephone] rings to deliver unsolicited
advertising, it is invading their privacy.” 136 Cong. Rec. H5820 (July 30, 1990).
Representative Fish similarly noted during debate surrounding the 1991 legislation:
“Over the years, I have heard an increasing number of complaints from
constituents who have been harassed by unsolicited sales calls.” 137 Cong. Rec.
H10343 (Nov. 18, 1991). See also id. (statement by Rep. Rinaldo noting that
“nonprofit organizations” do not engage in practices that “annoy[]” individuals).
The finding that commercial calls are far more annoying to consumers than
charitable solicitations was also documented in the House and Senate reports on
the TCPA. For example, the House Report cites studies conducted by two
telephone companies, which found that “Sales/solicitation and
Computer/advertising calls, respectively were the most often mentioned type of
problem or annoyance call.” See H.R. Rep. No. 102-317, at 8-9. The House
Report also cites a study by the National Association of Consumer Agency
Administrators, which found that just ten percent of complaints about
telemarketing involved charitable calls. See id. at 16-17. The Senate Report
similarly highlighted commercial telemarketing as the central source of annoyance
to individuals. See S. Rep. No. 102-177, at 2 (1991) (“[T]hose who complain . . .
cite the following problem[]: . . . telemarketers disturb consumers in the privacy of
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their homes with unsolicited sales pitches for undesired goods or services[.]”).6
Three years later, when Congress considered the Telemarketing and
Consumer Fraud Abuse Prevention Act of 1994 (“TCFPA”), the statute ordering
the FTC’s involvement in the problem of deceptive and abusive telemarketing
practices, a similar pattern emerged. Once again, it was clear that commercial calls
are considered far more intrusive by consumers than charitable calls – in part
because commercial callers tend to be more aggressive. Indeed, the telemarketers
admitted to this problem themselves. Richard A. Barton, vice president of the
Direct Marketing Association, a trade association whose membership includes
telemarketers, testified about complaints from senior citizens regarding
telemarketers who are “screaming at them over the phone and using curse words
and calling them all sorts of names to try to get them to buy” products. Hearing on
H.R. 868 Before the Subcomm. on Transport. & Hazardous Materials of the
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 103d Cong., at 37 (testimony of Richard Barton)
(1993). See also H.R. Rep. No. 103-20, at 4-5 (1993) (Submitted by former
Chairman Dingell) (recognizing that commercial calls are “coercive of a

6

As a result, when Congress passed the TCPA, requiring the FCC to initiate a
“rulemaking proceeding concerning the need to protect residential telephone subscribers’
privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations,” 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), it excluded
tax-exempt nonprofit organizations from its coverage, see id. at § 227(a)(3)(C). Congress
also exempted survey research calls from coverage under the 1991 Act because the
evidence showed that those types of calls, like charitable solicitations, were considered
less invasive by recipients. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-317, at 13.
7

consumer’s right to privacy”). Notably, none of the witnesses or other evidence
before Congress identified similar problems by charitable telemarketers.
Most recently, during various Congressional debates about the Do Not Call
rule itself, the record yet again pointed to commercial telemarketing – not
charitable telemarketing – as particularly intrusive to individuals and families.
Representative Holt summed up the sentiments that numerous Members of
Congress have heard from their constituents when he said, “The residents of my
district have pleaded with me to do something so that they can have a peaceful
family dinner, not interrupted by credit card solicitations or the latest condominium
offerings on some tropical locale.” 149 Cong. Rec. H408 (Feb. 12, 2003).
Representative Schakowsky expressed a similar sentiment: “Who has not had that
time [with our families] interrupted by commercial telemarketers? We all know
from personal experience how intrusive these calls can be.” Id. (emphasis added).
See also Hearing Before the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 108th Cong.
(2003) (noting that “many” deem “[u]nwanted telemarketing . . . to be an outright
invasion of privacy” and that excepting charitable solicitations is a matter of
“common sense”) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
The most recent testimony before Congress on this issue also confirmed that
consumers are far less resentful of charitable calls – and do not express the same
animus toward non-commercial telemarketers. For example, in April 2003, the
Chairman of the FTC testified before the House Appropriations Committee that
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“we’ve found that consumers overwhelmingly do not resent the charitable calls the
way they represent the calls from the non-charities.” Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, State & Judiciary of the House Appropriations
Comm., 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Timothy J. M uris, Chairman, FTC).
Moreover, the record before Congress indicated that consumers – whom the Do
Not Call rule seeks to protect – view the rule’s treatment of charitable solicitations
favorably, providing further evidence that citizens are less likely to find charitable
solicitations intrusive or annoying. As Chairman Muris testified, “surveys of
consumers in those states [with “do not call” rules] . . . indicate[] that consumers
like their . . . rule including the charitable exemption.” Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Timothy J.
Muris, Chairman, FTC).
Citizens tend to receive charitable solicitations more warmly in part because
charities are more concerned about keeping their donor base – and thus the
recipients of their calls – happy. Unlike commercial telemarketers, who typically
seek to make just one isolated sale, charitable solicitors have a far greater stake in
maintaining positive relationships with those they call. As Chairman Muris
testified, “My experience with the charities and a lot of people’s experiences, they
don’t want to offend their donor base and that if you tell them to don’t call you and
send a letter, that they’ll send you a letter.” Id. The FTC explicitly relied on this
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rationale in promulgating the challenged rules. See 68 Fed. Reg. at 4637 (noting
that likelihood of pattern of abusive calls is less for nonprofits because the
individual called “is more than a potential source of income[], he or she is also a
voter, a constituent, a consumer, a source of information to others” and thus can be
alienated “against the cause not just against the caller or their organization”).
In short, Congress has established a weighty record, over more than a dozen
years of debate, indicating that the “annoying ring on the phone” is far more
annoying when the person on the other end is “calling to sell something,” 149
Cong. Rec. H408 (Rep. Tauzin) (Feb. 12, 2003), rather than to solicit contributions
to a charity – and that they want the government to do something about it. See
Comment of Rep. Baldacci to FTC (Jan. 28, 2002) (“I have heard from many [of
my constituents] about the unwelcome intrusion of sales calls and the
ineffectiveness of current methods to eliminate the calls.”). That record is by itself
sufficient – indeed, far more than sufficient in light of the deference owed to
legislative judgments under the Central Hudson standard – to justify the FTC’s
differential treatment of commercial telemarketing and charitable solicitation in the
Do Not Call rule.
II.

The Legislative Record Underlying The Federal Trade Commission’s
Do Not Call Rule Demonstrates That Commercial Telemarketing Is Far
More Prone To Abuse Than Non-Commercial Telemarketing.
The legislative record indicates that commercial telemarketing is not only

more invasive than charitable solicitation but also far more prone to abuse. This
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concern, too, has been raised consistently throughout more than a decade of
Congressional inquiry into the telemarketing problem.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the evidence of abuse that led to passage of the
TCFAPA in 1994 focused almost exclusively on people who want to sell
something. Witness after witness cited abusive sales practices – not abuse by
charities. For example, John F. Barker, vice president of the National Consumers
League, testified that “many of the calls we receive, especially from older people,
report instances of smooth talking promoters who call repeatedly trying to coerce
them into purchasing beauty products, cameras, piles of dirt and offshore currency
futures rebates.” Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transport. & Hazardous
Materials of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 103d Cong., at 31 (1993)
(testimony of John F. Barker). During floor debate on the legislation, Members of
Congress similarly highlighted the core telemarketing abuses that Congress sought
to address – all of which, once again, involved commercial solicitations. As
Senator Hollings stated, “consumers are frequently lured into purchasing goods
and services with offers of investment opportunities, fabulous prizes, deluxe
vacations, and even household products such as vitamins, all at little or no cost.”
139 Cong. Rec. S8376 (June 30, 1993).
Other sales scams that came to the attention of Congress included
“everything from the fraudulent sale of major investments . . . [to] water filters,
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travel certificates, and cheap rubber dinghies.” H.R. Rep. 103-20, at 2-5 (Feb. 24,
1993). See also S. Rep. 103-80, at 2 (June 29, 1993) (listing other fraudulent
commercial schemes). And perhaps of greatest concern from a consumer
protection standpoint, Congress also heard reports of fraud in the sale of various
health care products by telephone. See 139 Cong. Rec. S8376-77 (Senator
McCain) (June 30, 1993) (noting the particularly acute problem of fraudulent
marketing of health-related products and services). Once again, none of these
scams involves charities. What is more, debate over passage of the USA
PATRIOT Act in 2001, which expanded the coverage of the TCFAPA to include
solicitations made on behalf of charities, evidenced that fraud associated with the
telemarketing of goods and services overwhelmingly exceeds the fraud associated
with all charitable contributions. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 6101(3) with 147 Cong.
Rec. S10065 (Senator McConnell) (Oct. 2, 2001).
In short, notwithstanding the TCFAPA’s partial success in combating
telemarketing fraud, there is no question that telemarketing fraud continues – and
that the most serious problems are in the area of sales. As former FTC Chairman
Robert Pitofsky testified in 1998, “[p]rize and sweepstakes promotions generate
more consumer complaints in the Commission’s complaint database than any other
type of telemarketing.” Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice,
State & the Judiciary of the Senate Appropriations Comm., 105th Cong. (1998)
(statement of Robert Pitofsky, former Chairman, FTC). See also 149 Cong. Rec.

12

S11964 (Senator Pryor) (Sept. 25, 2003) (“[W]e all know that fraud can very much
be a problem when it comes to telemarketing.”) For this reason too, the FTC’s
decision to limit the general Do Not Call rule to the commercial context was a
reasonable fit to address the telemarketing problems that have been identified by
Congress and the Commission over the last twelve years.
Conclusion
As the Supreme Court’s decisions have made clear, Congress may regulate
commercial speech so long as there is a “reasonable” – not “perfect” – fit between
the problem addressed by the regulation and the government’s solution. Fox, 492
U.S. at 480; see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at
433-34. The regulation need not be the “single best disposition” of a problem,
Fox, 492 U.S. at 480, and it need not be supported by scientific certainty or data. It
is enough that “simple common sense” supports the government’s judgment that a
particular regulation will help to alleviate a genuine problem. Florida Bar, 515
U.S. at 628.
The Do Not Call rule’s different treatment of commercial telemarketing and
charitable solicitation easily satisfies – indeed, far exceeds – that standard. The
legislative record underlying the Do Not Call rule speaks for itself. Time and
again, individuals have made clear to Congress that commercial calls – not
charitable calls – are the most annoying and thus most invasive of their privacy
interests. Moreover, Congress has collected substantial evidence that fraud and
abuse problems are associated more closely with commercial than with noncommercial telemarketing. In short, there is over a decade’s worth of legislative
findings that the bulk of telemarketing problems originally arose, and still arise,
from commercial calls. That is more than enough to show the requisite
“reasonable fit” between the FTC’s new rules and the problems they seek to
address.
In evaluating the distinction drawn between commercial and charitable calls,
this Court should be mindful that the government has not simply banned one type
of call while permitting the other. Instead, with respect to both commercial and
charitable calls, the law leaves to each citizen the decision of which calls to permit
and which to forbid. The difference, as explained above, see supra at 2-3, is in the
default rule: commercial calls are not to be made to those who sign up for the
registry – unless the individual authorizes an entity-specific exception; charitable
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calls may be made – but again, subject to a citizen’s choice to make an entityspecific exception. Amici believe that the legislative record in this case would
justify regulation that more definitely distinguishes between commercial and noncommercial calls. But it surely justifies this common-sense allocation of default
rules, which leaves the ultimate choice in each case to the individual.
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